Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish (2024): Interpreting Section 15 of the POCSO Act

Author: Anshika Srivastava
Student, Law centre II, Faculty of law ,DU

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💡 3 Quick Takeaways

Possession and transmission: In Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish, the Supreme Court clarified that liability under Section 15 of the POCSO Act is not dependent in every case on proof that child sexual abuse material was actually transmitted to another person.
Separate statutory offences: Section 15 addresses distinct forms of conduct involving the storage or possession of such material, including conduct involving an intention to transmit it and possession for commercial purposes.
Questions of intent: The judgment highlights the importance of assessing culpable mental state and the limits of a High Court’s power to quash criminal proceedings before trial. Questions concerning accidental or unwanted possession may require consideration of the particular facts and applicable statutory provisions.

I. Introduction

The increasing use of digital devices and the internet has made it easier to create, store and circulate child sexual abuse material. This development has raised difficult questions for criminal law, particularly concerning when the possession or storage of such material attracts criminal liability.

Section 15 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act), as amended in 2019, addresses specified forms of storage and possession of such material. However, its application has raised questions about whether proof of actual transmission is necessary and how the intention of the person possessing the material should be assessed. Different High Courts adopted different approaches to these questions.

In S. Harish v. Inspector of Police, the Madras High Court quashed criminal proceedings against a man who had downloaded and stored child sexual abuse material, reasoning that he had not transmitted it to anyone. The decision was challenged before the Supreme Court by the Just Rights for Children Alliance.

On 23 September 2024, a Bench comprising Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud and Justice J.B. Pardiwala delivered its judgment in Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish. The Supreme Court rejected the restrictive interpretation adopted by the High Court and examined Section 15 in light of the protective purpose of the POCSO Act. The judgment also addressed the terminology used to describe the material, directing that the expression “child pornography” be avoided in favour of “Child Sexual Exploitative and Abusive Material” (CSEAM).

The decision is significant for its interpretation of Section 15 and its consideration of the challenges posed by the digital storage and circulation of material documenting the sexual abuse of children.

II. Facts of the Case

The proceedings originated from information received by the authorities. In January 2020, the National Crime Records Bureau forwarded a Cyber Tipline Report identifying S. Harish as a person who regularly viewed child sexual abuse material. The Chennai police registered a First Information Report under Section 67B of the Information Technology Act, 2000, and Section 14(1) of the POCSO Act.

During the examination of Harish’s mobile phone, the police reportedly found two videos depicting the abuse of two young boys, along with more than a hundred other similar files stored on the device. Harish claimed that he had received the two videos through WhatsApp, but the forensic report was relied upon to challenge his account.

In September 2023, a charge sheet was filed invoking Section 15(1) of the POCSO Act, in addition to Section 67B of the Information Technology Act.

Harish approached the Madras High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), seeking to quash the proceedings. He argued that he had merely viewed and stored the material and had not forwarded it to anyone. On this basis, he contended that the relevant provisions did not apply to his conduct.

In January 2024, the High Court accepted his argument and quashed the proceedings. It reasoned that Section 14(1) required the child to have been used by the accused for the purpose of producing pornographic material and that Section 15 required proof of an intention to transmit the material.

The Just Rights for Children Alliance challenged this decision before the Supreme Court, arguing that the High Court’s interpretation would undermine the statutory prohibition on specified forms of possession and storage of child sexual abuse material.

III. Issues Raised

The principal issues before the Supreme Court were:

Whether the storage of child sexual abuse material could constitute an offence under Section 15 of the POCSO Act even where actual transmission had not been established.
Whether the three parts of Section 15 create distinct offences or must be read together as requiring an intention to transmit.
Whether Section 67B of the Information Technology Act applies to the alleged conduct even where actual transmission has not been proved.
Whether the High Court could determine, at the stage of quashing proceedings, that the accused lacked the requisite culpable mental state, or whether the question should be considered at trial in light of Section 30 of the POCSO Act.

IV. Analysis and Judgment

A. Interpretation of Section 15

The Supreme Court’s central interpretive approach was to treat the three sub-sections of Section 15 as addressing distinct forms of conduct rather than as a single offence requiring proof of an intention to transmit in every instance.

Section 15(1) addresses the possession or storage of child sexual abuse material where the person fails to delete or destroy it, or report it as required, in circumstances involving the intention specified by the provision. Section 15(2) addresses possession or storage for the purpose of transmitting, displaying, distributing or facilitating transmission, display or distribution, whether or not the transmission is ultimately completed. Section 15(3) addresses possession or storage for commercial purposes.

The Court’s interpretation makes clear that proof of actual transmission is not an indispensable requirement for every offence under Section 15. The precise ingredients of the applicable sub-section must, however, be established in accordance with the statutory language.

This interpretation addresses the concern that a person could avoid liability merely by arguing that the material was retained for personal viewing and was never forwarded. The statutory framework is concerned not only with distribution but also with specified forms of possession and storage that satisfy the requirements of the relevant provision.

B. The Protective Purpose of the POCSO Act

The Court’s reasoning reflects the broader objective of protecting children from sexual exploitation and abuse. The interpretation of a child-protection statute must take account of the harm addressed by the legislation, while remaining grounded in the language and structure of the relevant provision.

A related example is Independent Thought v. Union of India, in which the Supreme Court interpreted the exception to the offence of rape under the Indian Penal Code in a manner that protected minor wives. The decision demonstrates the Court’s willingness to examine statutory provisions in the context of their protective purpose.

The reasoning in Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish similarly emphasises the need to interpret Section 15 in a way that gives effect to the protection contemplated by the POCSO Act. At the same time, criminal liability must remain tied to the ingredients prescribed by Parliament. The protective purpose of a statute does not remove the requirement to establish the conduct and mental element applicable to the particular offence.

C. Distinction Between Sections 14 and 15

An important aspect of the judgment concerns the distinction between Sections 14 and 15 of the POCSO Act.

Section 14 addresses the use of a child for pornographic purposes and prescribes punishment in the circumstances specified by that provision. Section 15, by contrast, deals with specified forms of possession and storage of material depicting sexual exploitation or abuse of children.

The High Court’s reasoning effectively imported a requirement associated with Section 14 into Section 15. The Supreme Court’s analysis treated Section 15 as a separate provision with its own ingredients. The question under Section 15 is therefore not simply whether the accused personally used a child to produce the material, but whether the conduct alleged satisfies the elements of the relevant sub-section.

This distinction is important because separate statutory offences must be analysed according to their own wording and requirements rather than treated as interchangeable.

D. The Power to Quash Criminal Proceedings

The judgment also addressed the limits of the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC.

The power to quash criminal proceedings exists to prevent abuse of the process of the court and to secure the ends of justice. It is not ordinarily intended to provide a forum for a detailed assessment of disputed evidence or a final determination of the accused’s guilt before trial.

The Supreme Court considered the High Court’s conclusion concerning Harish’s intention and the applicable statutory presumption. Under Section 30 of the POCSO Act, where the foundational facts necessary to attract the provision are established, the statutory presumption concerning culpable mental state operates, subject to the terms of the section and the accused’s opportunity to rebut it.

The existence and application of that presumption must be assessed in accordance with the statutory framework. Where the determination of intention depends on disputed facts or evidence, it may be inappropriate to resolve the matter conclusively at the quashing stage.

This approach is consistent with the principles governing the exercise of inherent jurisdiction, including those discussed in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal. The question is whether the allegations and material, considered within the applicable legal framework, justify continuation of the proceedings—not whether the accused should be convicted before the trial has taken place.

E. Terminology: From “Child Pornography” to CSEAM

The Supreme Court also addressed the terminology used to describe material depicting the sexual abuse or exploitation of children. It directed that the expression “child pornography” should be avoided in favour of “Child Sexual Exploitative and Abusive Material” (CSEAM).

The concern underlying this direction is that the word “pornography” may suggest consensual sexual expression, whereas the material under consideration documents the exploitation or abuse of children. CSEAM more directly conveys the nature of the conduct and the harm to the child.

The direction also draws attention to the language used by courts, police authorities and other institutions when dealing with these offences. The terminology should accurately reflect the exploitation and abuse involved, rather than obscure it through language associated with consensual adult material.

The judgment’s discussion of terminology must nevertheless be distinguished from the wording of the statutory provisions themselves. The language used in legislation remains a matter for Parliament, while courts and authorities must consider and apply the directions issued by the Supreme Court.

F. Accidental or Unwanted Possession

One question requiring careful attention is how the statutory provisions apply where a person receives such material without requesting it—for example, through an unsolicited message or a group chat.

The distinction between deliberate collection and unwanted receipt may be relevant to the factual and legal assessment. However, the precise consequences depend on the conduct alleged, the applicable sub-section of Section 15, the relevant mental element and any other statutory requirements.

The possibility of accidental receipt does not, by itself, establish either criminal liability or an automatic exemption. The facts must be examined within the statutory framework, including any applicable presumption and the opportunity to rebut it. This remains an important area in which the application of the law to particular circumstances requires careful judicial consideration.

V. Conclusion

The judgment in Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish clarifies the interpretation of Section 15 of the POCSO Act and rejects the proposition that liability invariably depends on proof that the material was actually transmitted to another person. The applicable ingredients depend on the particular sub-section under which the accused is charged.

The Supreme Court also emphasised the distinction between Sections 14 and 15 and the importance of assessing the alleged conduct under the correct statutory provision. Questions concerning intention and culpable mental state must be considered in accordance with Section 30 and the limits of the High Court’s power to quash proceedings before trial.

The direction to use the expression “Child Sexual Exploitative and Abusive Material” instead of “child pornography” further highlights the need for terminology that accurately reflects the exploitation and abuse of children.

The judgment strengthens the statutory framework for addressing child sexual abuse material in the digital environment. Its application in individual cases must nevertheless remain attentive to the precise ingredients of the offence, the evidence available and the distinction between deliberate conduct and circumstances requiring further factual assessment.

References

Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish, 2024 INSC 716.
Independent Thought v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 800.
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335.
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, Sections 14(1), 15 and 30.
Information Technology Act, 2000, Section 67B.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 482.
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, 25 May 2000, 2171 UNTS 227.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Lawscape.

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