How Sanofi India Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation Redefines Corporate Criminal Liability in India

Author: Aaditya Rohilla
Student, Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies, New Delhi

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💡 3 Quick Takeaways

  1. A company can be prosecuted for offences requiring mens rea, even when no specific employee or official has been identified or arraigned as an accused.CS
  2. The Supreme Court established a three-stage framework for attributing the acts and mental state of natural persons to corporate entities.
  3. Non-identification or non-arraignment of an individual does not automatically justify quashing proceedings against a company under Section 482 CrPC.

For years, it was quite common to consider the prosecution’s case against a company effectively untenable if the chargesheet named the company but did not identify any employee whose mens rea could be attributed to it. This was a significant concern in the development of corporate criminal liability in India until the Hon’ble Supreme Court addressed the issue on 7 September 2026 in Sanofi India Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2026 INSC 957).

Before analysing the Supreme Court’s judgment, it is important to address the fundamental question: Can a company be prosecuted at all?

The Indian legal framework has faced two fundamental problems in this regard.

The Imprisonment Dilemma: It is often argued that since a company has no physical body of its own, it is practically impossible to incarcerate it, ultimately rendering the prosecution of a company for a criminal offence infructuous.

Mens Rea: Some argue that a company has no mind of its own and, consequently, cannot possess mens rea or the guilty intention required to commit a criminal offence.

For a considerable period, several High Courts accepted these contentions.

However, the first objection was settled by the Supreme Court in Standard Chartered Bank and Others v. Directorate of Enforcement and Others, where it was observed that the mere fact that an offence is punishable with mandatory imprisonment does not render a company immune from criminal prosecution. The law does not compel the impossible; therefore, the court may impose a fine alone on a juristic person where the relevant provision prescribes imprisonment as well as a fine.

As far as the issue of mens rea is concerned, the Supreme Court, in various judgments, including Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., has held that a company can possess mens rea, a position that has been reaffirmed in the Sanofi India judgment.

Sanofi India supplied pharmaceutical products for the Rare Materials Project at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) from 2011 to 2016. The CBI alleged that Sanofi India Ltd., along with Dr. P. Anand, a Scientific Officer at BARC, conspired with pharmaceutical companies to procure medicines at inflated rates and in quantities exceeding the actual requirements. The chargesheet was filed against only two accused: Dr. P. Anand and Sanofi India Ltd. No employee or official of the company, whose mens rea could be attributed to it, was arraigned.

Sanofi filed a petition before the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court seeking to quash the proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), which was dismissed. Aggrieved by the decision, Sanofi India preferred an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

In India, there is no disagreement regarding the position that corporations can possess mens rea and, accordingly, be held liable for offences requiring proof of such intention. The Bombay High Court made instructive observations in State of Maharashtra v. Syndicate Transport Co. (P) Ltd., which are also reflected in the Sanofi India judgment.

The Bombay High Court accepted, as a matter of principle, that a corporate body can and ought to be held liable for offences requiring mens rea. This conclusion was supported by the Court’s recognition that circumstances may exist in which the criminal act of an agent, including their state of mind, ought to be treated as the act and state of mind of the company itself.

There has, however, been very limited discussion in India regarding how and in what manner corporations can possess mens rea. This is a more complex question, and its determination requires careful examination of facts and attention to detail. Once it is accepted that corporations can be held criminally liable, the next question is: How can such liability be established?

It is undisputed that a company has neither a body nor a mind of its own. The acts said to be performed by a company are, in fact, performed by one or more natural persons. Such persons must be in a position to exercise the company’s powers with sufficient discretion and independence, whether those powers are vested in them through the company’s constitutional documents or delegated to them.

The Supreme Court addressed this question in the Sanofi India judgment by referring to observations made and principles developed by English jurists in various cases.

For instance, Viscount Haldane observed in Lennard’s Carrying Company v. Asiatic Petroleum Company, [1915] A.C. 705, that a company, being merely an abstraction, has no body or mind of its own. Its “directing mind” exists in a natural person whose acts are treated as the acts of the company itself. Accordingly, the liability is direct and not vicarious.

Another crucial English decision in this regard is Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass. Although the five judges differed in their opinions regarding who qualifies as the embodiment of a company, there was consensus regarding the delegation principle. According to this principle, a person entrusted with the company’s powers and granted full discretion, without those powers being subject to instructions or oversight from someone above them, may become an embodiment of the company. Apart from delegation, the judges also recognised that senior management could act as the company’s embodiment.

In Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd. v. Securities Commission, Lord Hoffmann identified primary, general and special rules of attribution, observing that attribution is a matter of interpretation rather than a search for a company’s “brain”.

Taking guidance from the approach adopted under English law, the Supreme Court established a three-stage framework for attribution.

The first stage examines whether the relevant powers are vested in a person through the company’s constitutional documents or a rule implied by company law.

The second stage concerns the delegation of the company’s powers to a person, whether expressly or impliedly, with sufficient discretion and independence in exercising those powers.

The third stage involves a statutory purpose inquiry. This stage is reached only when attribution cannot be established through the first two stages. Where the statutory purpose is narrow, the court examines whether that purpose, considered in the abstract, requires a special rule of attribution. Where the statutory purpose is broad, the court examines whether the purpose, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, requires such a rule. If it does, the court must further determine whose act the relevant provision intends to treat as the company’s own and whether the person concerned falls within that class.

The third stage exists because the first two stages are relatively narrow. It introduces flexibility by looking outward at the purpose of the statute, whereas the first two stages focus inward on the company’s internal structure.

The Court further clarified that since this framework incorporates corporate liability within the individualistic conception of criminal liability, the required mens rea must exist in full within at least one natural person before it can be attributed to the company. There may be instances in which partial mens rea is found in more than one individual; however, the partial states of mind of different persons cannot be combined to establish the company’s guilty intention. Natural persons are, therefore, the foundation upon which the conception of corporate mens rea rests.

The Court also distinguished between two exercises that are easily confused: identification and attribution.

Identification is the factual exercise of establishing who was involved, what they did and what they intended. Attribution, on the other hand, is the legal exercise, carried out through the three stages discussed above, of determining whether that person’s act and state of mind can be treated as those of the company.

Attribution operates only in one direction, from the individual to the company, and does not affect the individual’s own criminal liability. Since it is an intricate and fact-sensitive inquiry, it is ultimately a matter for trial. Consequently, identification does not assume primary importance at the threshold stage. The Court confined its reasoning on this issue to the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC.

The Supreme Court further held that non-identification of a natural person does not, by itself, justify quashing criminal proceedings. It is sufficient at the threshold stage for the chargesheet to disclose that the corporation itself has committed the offence. This may be established through averments concerning the company’s own conduct, decisions and dealings, without necessarily naming the specific individuals who carried them out.

The Court also clarified its decisions in Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Pvt. Ltd. and Hindustan Unilever Ltd. v. State of M.P. In these cases, the statutory provisions, namely Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and Section 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, respectively, required the company to be arraigned as a prerequisite for prosecuting the individuals concerned.

The Court clarified that these decisions cannot be interpreted as establishing a general rule that arraignment of a natural person is a prerequisite for maintaining prosecution against a company. These cases concern vicarious liability, where a statute makes an individual’s liability dependent upon the company’s commission of an offence. In such circumstances, the company must be arraigned. Where a company is directly liable through attribution, no such general statutory requirement exists.

However, the Court itself acknowledged that the framework is narrow and continues to leave certain legal lacunae. For instance, situations may arise where the commission of a criminal offence results from the partial states of mind of several individuals. Since these cannot be combined, attributing mens rea to a company may prove difficult in practice, particularly given the complexity of modern corporate structures.

This may result in companies facing criminal trials without knowing which specific individual was involved in the alleged offence, as the allegations at the quashing stage need only establish that some natural person or persons acted on the company’s behalf. Another ambiguity that remains concerns the definition and measurement of “sufficient discretion and independence”.

Despite these limitations, the judgment is significant because the observations made by Justice J.B. Pardiwala clearly establish that once an offence is prima facie disclosed by the allegations, and those allegations show that some natural person or persons acted on behalf of the company in relation to the offence, arraignment of specific individuals is not a statutory prerequisite, at least at the stage of considering a petition for quashing. The mere absence of an employee or official of the company as an accused cannot, by itself, become a ground for quashing proceedings, as doing so would allow Section 482 CrPC to stifle prosecutions at the outset.

In practice, however, a chargesheet cannot rest on bare assertions. The allegations must establish, at least prima facie, that some natural person or persons acted on behalf of the company, that their conduct is referable to the offence in question, and that the surrounding circumstances do not make the existence of guilty intention patently absurd or inherently improbable. Bald allegations can still be quashed. However, an argument that the person concerned lacks a particular status or position will rarely succeed at this stage, as the question of attribution requires examination at trial.

The framework also has its limitations in terms of applicability. It is generally not required where a statute specifically identifies the persons whose acts count as those of the company, creates vicarious liability or imposes strict liability on the company. The Court has also emphasised the need for investigating agencies to develop the necessary expertise to prosecute corporations and has left it to the legislature to make corporate convictions easier, for instance, through failure-to-prevent offences such as Section 9 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

The Supreme Court accordingly dismissed Sanofi India’s appeal, leaving the criminal proceedings to continue.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Lawscape.


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