Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2018): Religious Freedom, Gender Equality and Constitutional Morality

Author: Bhumika Sholapurkar
Student, Karnataka State Law University’s Law School

——————————————————————————————————————–

đź’ˇ 3 Quick Takeaways

  1. In its 2018 majority judgment, the Supreme Court held that excluding women aged 10–50 from the Sabarimala Temple was unconstitutional and violated fundamental rights.
  2. The Court examined the relationship between Articles 14, 15, 17, 21, 25 and 26 of the Constitution, particularly the tension between gender equality and religious autonomy.
  3. The judgment highlighted constitutional morality and the limits of religious customs, while Justice Indu Malhotra’s dissent emphasised judicial restraint in matters of faith and religious belief.

I. Introduction

Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, reported in (2019) 11 SCC 1, is a significant constitutional case concerning religious freedom, gender equality, and the right of women to enter places of public worship. The Supreme Court delivered its judgment on 28 September 2018 through a Constitution Bench comprising Chief Justice Dipak Misra and Justices R.F. Nariman, A.M. Khanwilkar, D.Y. Chandrachud, and Indu Malhotra.

The dispute concerned the traditional exclusion of women between the ages of 10 and 50 from the Sabarimala Temple in Kerala, dedicated to Lord Ayyappa. The practice was defended on the basis of the deity’s status as a Naishtika Brahmachari, or eternal celibate, and the religious traditions associated with the pilgrimage.

The petitioners challenged the exclusion as discriminatory and unconstitutional. The case consequently raised fundamental questions about whether religious customs could justify restrictions that affected women’s equality, dignity, and freedom to practise religion.

By a 4:1 majority, the Supreme Court allowed the petition and held the exclusionary practice unconstitutional. The judgment examined the relationship between religious freedom and fundamental rights, the essential religious practices doctrine, the status of Lord Ayyappa’s devotees as a religious denomination, and the role of constitutional morality.

II. Facts of the Case

The Sabarimala Temple is a prominent Hindu temple situated in Kerala and dedicated to Lord Ayyappa. The deity is worshipped at Sabarimala in the form of a Naishtika Brahmachari. According to the traditional belief associated with the temple, the deity’s celibate nature was considered a reason for restricting the entry of women between approximately 10 and 50 years of age.

The restriction was justified on the belief that the presence of women of menstruating age would affect the celibacy and austerity associated with Lord Ayyappa. It prevented women in this age group from entering the temple and offering worship.

The practice was also associated with Vratham, a 41-day period of penance and religious discipline traditionally undertaken before the pilgrimage. In earlier proceedings, it was argued that women between 10 and 50 years of age could not observe the required period of penance because of physiological reasons. However, the material before the Kerala High Court indicated that the historical practice was not entirely uniform. Women within the restricted age group had, on certain occasions, visited the temple, including for ceremonies such as the first rice-feeding ceremony of their children.

The issue had previously been considered by the Kerala High Court in S. Mahendran v. Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board, AIR 1993 Ker 42. The High Court upheld the restriction, treating it as an established religious usage and concluding that it did not violate Articles 15, 25, and 26 of the Constitution.

The controversy subsequently reached the Supreme Court through a petition filed by the Indian Young Lawyers Association and others under Article 32 of the Constitution. The petitioners challenged the exclusion of women aged 10–50 and the validity of Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965, which permitted restrictions based on custom or usage.

The matter was referred to a Constitution Bench because it raised substantial questions concerning fundamental rights, religious freedom, gender equality, and the constitutional validity of religious customs.

III. Legal Issues

The Constitution Bench considered several interconnected legal issues:

  1. Whether excluding women between the ages of 10 and 50 from entering the Sabarimala Temple violated the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
  2. Whether the exclusion amounted to discrimination on the ground of sex under Articles 14 and 15.
  3. Whether the practice was protected under Article 25(1) as an essential part of the religious practice of Lord Ayyappa’s devotees.
  4. Whether the devotees of Lord Ayyappa constituted a separate religious denomination entitled to protection under Article 26.
  5. Whether the exclusion of women aged 10–50 qualified as an essential religious practice.
  6. Whether Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965, was constitutionally valid.
  7. Whether the religious status of Lord Ayyappa as a Naishtika Brahmachari could justify the exclusion.
  8. Whether morality under Article 25 should be understood through traditional or public morality, or through the principles of constitutional morality, equality, and dignity.

These issues required the Court to examine the extent to which religious autonomy could be exercised consistently with constitutional guarantees.

IV. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioners’ Arguments

The Indian Young Lawyers Association argued that the exclusion of women between the ages of 10 and 50 was discriminatory and unconstitutional. The petitioners contended that the practice violated Articles 14, 15, 17, 21, and 25 of the Constitution.

They emphasised that Article 25(1) protects the freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practise, and propagate religion for “all persons”. Women, therefore, should not be denied the right to enter the temple and worship Lord Ayyappa merely because of their gender or biological characteristics.

The petitioners also challenged the justification based on the deity’s status as a Naishtika Brahmachari. They argued that a classification based on menstruation and age lacked a constitutionally valid justification and violated the guarantee of equality.

Further, the petitioners disputed that Lord Ayyappa’s devotees constituted a separate religious denomination under Article 26. They argued that Sabarimala was a public Hindu temple managed by the Travancore Devaswom Board and that the constitutional protections governing temple entry were applicable.

Finally, the petitioners challenged Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules. They contended that subordinate legislation could not authorise a complete prohibition on women’s entry where such a prohibition violated fundamental rights.

B. Respondents’ Arguments

The respondents, including the Travancore Devaswom Board and supporters of the traditional practice, argued that the restriction arose from the distinctive religious character of Lord Ayyappa at Sabarimala as a Naishtika Brahmachari.

They contended that the exclusion of women aged 10–50 was necessary to preserve the deity’s celibate and austere character and formed part of the religious tradition associated with the pilgrimage.

The respondents also argued that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa constituted a distinct religious denomination or sect protected under Article 26. They relied on the devotees’ distinctive religious traditions, customs, code of conduct, and observance of the 41-day Vratham.

In addition, the respondents maintained that the exclusion was an essential religious practice rather than an ordinary social custom. They relied on historical material, including the Memoir of the Survey of the Travancore and Cochin States, published in 1893 and 1901, and the earlier Kerala High Court judgment in S. Mahendran v. Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board.

V. Judgment of the Supreme Court

On 28 September 2018, the Supreme Court, by a 4:1 majority, allowed the petition and held that the practice of excluding women between the ages of 10 and 50 from entering the Sabarimala Temple was unconstitutional.

The majority held that Article 25(1) protects the right of every person to profess and practise religion. The expression “all persons” includes women, and their right to practise religion cannot be denied merely on the basis of gender or biological characteristics.

The Court also held that the exclusion violated the constitutional guarantee against discrimination under Article 15(1). The restriction was based on a biological characteristic associated with women and could not be justified merely by reference to religious tradition.

The majority rejected the contention that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa constituted a separate religious denomination entitled to protection under Article 26 in the circumstances of the case. It also concluded that the exclusion of women aged 10–50 was not an essential religious practice entitled to constitutional protection on the grounds advanced.

The Court emphasised constitutional morality, holding that religious freedom must be understood in the context of constitutional values, including equality, dignity, and liberty. Public morality could not serve as a justification for discrimination against women.

Consequently, Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965, was declared unconstitutional to the extent that it permitted the exclusion of women on the basis of the impugned practice. The judgment directed that women of all ages should be permitted to enter the Sabarimala Temple and offer worship.

Justice Indu Malhotra dissented. Her separate opinion emphasised judicial restraint in matters of faith and religious belief, highlighting the difficulties involved in adjudicating religious practices through constitutional litigation.

VI. Ratio Decidendi

The central ratio of the majority judgment was that the exclusion of women between the ages of 10 and 50 from entering the Sabarimala Temple and worshipping Lord Ayyappa was unconstitutional.

The majority interpreted Article 25(1) as protecting the religious freedom of all persons, including women. It held that the exclusion could not be justified merely by reference to menstruation, biological characteristics, or the religious tradition associated with the deity’s celibate status.

The Court also rejected the claim that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa at Sabarimala constituted a separate religious denomination entitled to protection under Article 26 in the circumstances before it. The exclusion was not accepted as an essential religious practice that could justify the restriction.

The majority further emphasised that religious practices must be examined in light of constitutional guarantees, including equality and dignity. On that basis, Rule 3(b) was held unconstitutional to the extent that it permitted the impugned exclusion.

VII. Critical Analysis and Constitutional Significance

A. Religious Freedom and Gender Equality

The judgment addressed the tension between religious autonomy and the constitutional guarantee of equality. Articles 25 and 26 protect religious freedom and specified rights of religious denominations, while Articles 14 and 15 protect equality and prohibit discrimination on constitutionally impermissible grounds.

The majority’s reasoning placed particular emphasis on the fact that Article 25(1) applies to “all persons”. This approach brought the religious freedom of women to the forefront of the dispute and rejected the proposition that a religious tradition could, by itself, justify their exclusion from a public place of worship.

The decision therefore forms an important part of the constitutional debate about how religious practices should be evaluated when they intersect with individual rights.

B. Essential Religious Practices

The essential religious practices doctrine was central to the dispute. The respondents argued that excluding women of menstruating age was an essential and integral part of the worship associated with Lord Ayyappa at Sabarimala.

The majority did not accept that argument as a basis for sustaining the exclusion. The case illustrates the difficulty of determining which practices form an essential part of a religion and how claims of religious autonomy should be assessed when they conflict with constitutional guarantees.

The doctrine also raises questions about the relationship between judicial scrutiny and the beliefs of religious communities.

C. Constitutional Morality

Constitutional morality was another important element of the majority’s reasoning. The judgment emphasised that constitutional values such as equality, dignity, and liberty must inform the interpretation and application of fundamental rights.

The decision rejected the use of public morality as a justification for the discriminatory exclusion at issue. It thereby highlighted the distinction between a practice being accepted as a tradition within a community and that practice being constitutionally permissible.

D. Religious Autonomy and the Dissent

The dissenting opinion of Justice Indu Malhotra emphasised judicial restraint in matters of faith and religious belief. This perspective raised concerns about the extent to which courts should examine religious practices and determine their essential character.

The disagreement between the majority and the dissent reflects a broader constitutional question: how should courts balance individual equality with the autonomy of religious communities to maintain their beliefs and practices?

The case is therefore significant not only for its conclusion on temple entry but also for the competing approaches it illustrates to judicial review of religious customs.

VIII. Conclusion

Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala marked an important development in Indian constitutional law by examining the relationship between religious freedom, gender equality, and constitutional morality.

The Supreme Court’s 2018 majority judgment held that the exclusion of women aged 10–50 from the Sabarimala Temple was unconstitutional. It emphasised that women enjoy the protection of Article 25(1) and that religious traditions must be examined in the context of constitutional guarantees of equality and dignity.

The judgment also addressed the essential religious practices doctrine, the status of Lord Ayyappa’s devotees as a religious denomination, and the validity of Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules. At the same time, Justice Indu Malhotra’s dissent highlighted the importance of judicial restraint in matters of faith and religious belief.

The case represents a significant constitutional debate concerning the boundaries of religious autonomy and the protection of individual rights. Its broader importance lies in the challenge of reconciling religious freedom with equality, dignity, and the constitutional principles governing public life.

IX. Authorities and References

Cases

  1. Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1.
  2. S. Mahendran v. Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board, AIR 1993 Ker 42.

Constitutional Provisions

  1. Constitution of India, Articles 14, 15, 17, 21, 25, and 26.
  2. Constitution of India, Article 32.

Legislation

  1. Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965, Rule 3(b).

Secondary Sources

  1. Deepa Das Acevedo, “Gods’ Homes, Men’s Courts, Women’s Rights,” 16 International Journal of Constitutional Law 552 (2018).
  2. Vrinda Narain, “Constitutionalizing Women’s Equality in India: Assessing the Sabarimala Decision,” 42 Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 77 (2022).
  3. Nidhi Chauhan, “Case Comment: Indian Young Lawyers’ Association & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors.,” 1(1) Bennett Journal of Legal Studies 185 (2020).
  4. Aparajito Sen, “Interpreting Group-Based Religious Freedoms: Sabarimala and the Movement from Definitions to Limitations,” 15 NALSAR Student Law Review 1 (2021).
  5. K. Singh, “Entry of Women in Sabarimala Temple, a Right or a Right in Disguise,” 18 Supremo Amicus 444 (2020).

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Lawscape.

The Lawscape — clear, practical legal insight for students and future lawyers.

Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *